

COMPASS/UPTAKE/IAI workshop
**‘The EU and resilience: interrogating theory,
policies and practice’, 9 November 2018**
Workshop Proceedings (29 April 2019)

GCRF COMPASS: Comprehensive Capacity-Building in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Central Asia: research integration, impact governance & sustainable communities (ES/P010849/1)



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Preface

UKRI GCRF ‘COMPASS’ (2017-2021) project brings together the Universities of Kent, Cambridge, ADA University, Belarusian State University, Tajik National University and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan.

On 9th November 2018, COMPASS organised a workshop together with the H2020 UPTAKE project and the Rome-based Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). The workshop, titled “The EU and resilience: interrogating theory, policies and practice” brought together over forty participants to reflect on the concept of resilience and its application in the EU’s policies towards the eastern neighbourhood and Central Asia. Participants included COMPASS team members from all six partner institutions; COMPASS Advisory Board members; PhD students from the UPTAKE consortium; and external participants. The workshop was opened by Professor Elena Korosteleva, COMPASS PI (University of Kent), and the key note was delivered by Professor Nathalie Tocci (COMPASS AB member, Special Adviser to the European Union’s HR/VP Federica Mogherini, and Director of the IAI).

The first panel was entitled, ‘The EU and resilience: interrogating theory’. The five speakers who presented there included David Chandler (Westminster University and COMPASS AB member); Trine Flockhart (Southern Denmark University and COMPASS AB member); Mareile Kaufmann (University of Oslo/PRIO); Luca Mavelli (University of Kent); Jonathan Joseph (Sheffield University); and Chris Henry as provocateur (University of Kent). They discussed the interpretation of resilience; the relationship between resilience and capacity-building; whether there is or should be the link between academics and policy-makers; and the role resilience plays in research, should the aim be description or prescription?

The second panel focussed on ‘The EU and resilience: interrogating policies’. The speakers were Hugh Macleaman (OECD); Ana Juncos (Bristol University); Pol Bagues (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs); Rosanne Anholt (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Laure Delcour (College of Europe); and David Chandler as provocateur. This panel considered how the term ‘resilience’ was and (how) it has changed over time; how it could or should be applied in policies especially

those targeting capacity-building; does the EU have the 'right' and legitimacy to have transformative aims regarding resilience of other states, if its own resilience is currently under pressure; and whether 'resilience' exists objectively and independently, or can it only exist through practice?

Panel 3 looked at concrete practices of resilience-building by the EU in other states. The panel was called, 'The EU and resilience: interrogating practice' and the speakers were Sue Griffith (GPG London and COMPASS AB member); Rashad Ibadov (ADA University); Siddharth Saxena (COMPASS Co-I Cambridge University); Irina Petrova (Catholic University Leuven and COMPASS affiliate); Tatiana Romanova (St Petersburg State University and COMPASS AB member); and Timofei Bordachev as provocateur (CCEIS HSE). In this panel the role of Russia especially with regards to the EU's Eastern Partnership policy was considered, as was the idea of how Central Asia and wider Eurasia understand and respond to EU's 'resilience' within and outside the region.

The papers presented here are a snapshot of what was discussed at the workshop. They highlight some of the more salient and important points with regards to the EU's resilience which are important for the COMPASS project in wider Eurasia. **David Chandler's** paper on 'Resilience: the contemporary challenges' defines, locates and describes the concept of resilience in policy and academia. He uses the lens of Anthropocene to delve into the challenges that resilience, the concept, poses for policy-makers especially those following a neo-liberal paradigm. He offers an insightful critique of resilience-theory and how it fails to address some of the key questions it was initially meant to answer.

The paper by **Trine Flockhart** challenges the understanding of the liberal order and the assumption that it is resilience simply because it holds global appeal. Her paper entitled, 'Understanding the resilience of the liberal order' challenges the very notion of EU's resilience and its use in policy making. She considers the importance of locating real alternative to the thinking of the liberal order which assumes ascendancy simply by wont of what it believes it offers rather than engaging with perspectives of different regions and institutions.

This is juxtaposed by the next paper by **Tatiana Romanova** who looks at 'What's resilience in Russia-EU relations?' and which brings into focus the importance of Russia as a threat in the global order for EU's policies and concept of resilience. She not only questions the objectiveness of EU's policies with regards to Russia but calls into question the EU's Eastern Partnership policy which is built around the threat that Russia poses and the ability of the EU to withstand those threats. She refers to this particular understanding as the EU's colonial thinking which requires a complete re-haul in order to successfully engage with both the concept of resilience, the Eastern Partnership, and Russia.

The paper by **Siddharth Saxena** entitled 'The Silk Road and Resilience' offers Eurasia as an alternative to understanding and responding to EU's resilience. He paints a vivid picture of the historic Silk Road and the countries of Central Asia and beyond traversing, surviving and flourishing on it. The region's resilience is both an answer and a challenge to the EU's narrow understanding of resilience and its neighbours. His paper goes on to offer concrete examples for knowledge production and manufacturing especially in the realm of science and technology which are necessary for economic growth beyond what the EU offers.

Akram Umarov's paper is titled 'Foreign policy of Uzbekistan in supporting to build state resilience in Afghanistan'. The paper addresses the conflict in Afghanistan and the ways in which neighbouring states can help increase the resilience of the Afghan state. Umarov demonstrates that resilience on a national level can also enhance peace and stability in the region as a whole, and that state resilience is therefore a matter that goes beyond national interests only.

Overall, the papers offer a cross-section of research on the concept of resilience which fit well with the themes of the workshop and the roundtables. They provide examples of the understanding of resilience from the perspectives of the EU, policy makers and academia and also posit views on what challenges EU's resilience must overcome in order to be relevant. The global order is in flux at the moment and the EU along with the liberal order must overcome its own biases and its limited thinking and actively engage with the rest of the world, especially the Eurasian region. Eurasia is not only home to some of the largest and fastest growing economies but is also home to ancient civilizations which have proven they are resilient over a far longer stretch of time. Taken together they offer new and exciting perspectives on capacity-building in the EU/UK with a view to engage more successfully with Central Asia and wider Eurasia. These are essential tools for COMPASS to be able to engage with in order to provide a fuller and more comprehensive picture for stakeholders: policy makers, academics, media personnel, civil society organisations and others.

Prof Elena Korosteleva (COMPASS PI, University of Kent) opened the workshop by outlining the 'puzzle of resilience' – a concept propelled by the EU's Global Security Strategy (2016) into a wider use in EU policies, and yet, the concept, its modus operandi and expectations, remain ambiguous. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the unifying meaning (if any) of the concept; its application to EU policies and how it is and can be implemented in practice, across the wider Eurasian region in particular.

Dr Nargis Nurulla-Khodzhaeva (TNU) commented about the limited and Euro-centric understanding of resilience which ignored centuries old thinkers like ibn-Ghazali and ibn-Sina. She focused on the importance of bringing the 'local' into conversation which could accommodate the full spectrum of socialization to understand resilience especially in the context of EU's engagement with its Eastern neighbourhood and Central Asia.

Contributions are presented in alphabetical order.

DAVID CHANDLER¹ –The End of Resilience? Rethinking Adaptation in the Anthropocene

Resilience has rapidly spread throughout the policy world over the last two decades, driven by the desire to use systems theories and process understandings to develop adaptive approaches. However, under the auspices of the Anthropocene, the assumptions and goals of resilience have become problematized, providing a critique of resilience-thinking which is much more powerful than that levelled by critical societal and political theorists who have, over the last decade, condemned resilience discourses for their imbrications within neoliberal paradigms.² In fact, the Anthropocene appears to directly challenge the assumption of Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper that resilience-thinking was immune to critique, 'reabsorbing' or 'metabolizing critique into its internal dynamic' as 'the complex adaptive system remains self-referential even when it encounters the most violent of shocks'.³ This was correct as long as policy-makers and academic theorists presumed a modernist 'world' external to us; one amenable to governing and policy interventions. In this case, resilience thinking could 'reabsorb' or 'metabolize' shocks and 'bounce-back' through learning from disasters – even reimagining catastrophes as 'emancipatory'⁴ – or as facilitating new forms of self-growth and improved systems of self-management, 'bouncing-forward' with what the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, Judith Rodin, describes as the 'resilience dividend'.⁵

In many ways, conceptualisations of the Anthropocene follow through on the promissory notes of the globalisation discussions of the 1990s, in drawing out the implications of relational and system-thinking, which hold that there is no longer an 'inside' and an 'outside'.⁶ Constructions of 'insides' are those of autonomous agency or actors, central to modernist framings of law and politics: 'individuals', 'states', 'minds' etc. are no longer conceived to be separate from the world of relations which constitute them, but as integral parts. 'Outsides' were seen to be merely mechanical, bound by natural laws and processes and amenable to objective knowledge and regulatory control: thus 'nature', the 'environment' and 'non-humans' were constructed as objects to be known by subjects. This division between insides and outsides enabled modernist imaginaries of 'progress', 'civilisation' and 'development', based on the intensification of these binary divisions. Fixed understandings of time and space were thus key to the constitution of the binaries of 'inside' and 'outside', forming the framework or backdrop, which was fixed and stable, within which human dramas played out.

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² Walker, J. and Cooper, M. (2011) 'Genealogies of resilience: from systems ecology to the political economy of crisis adaptation', *Security Dialogue* 42(2): 143–160; Evans, B. and J. Reid (2014) *Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; Chandler, D. (2014) *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity*. Abingdon: Routledge; Joseph, J. (2013) Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach', *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 1(1): 38-52.

³ Walker and Cooper, 'Genealogies of resilience', 157.

⁴ Beck, U. (2015) 'Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does it Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?', *Current Sociology* 63(1): 75-88.

⁵ Rodin, J. (2015) *The Resilience Dividend: Managing disruption, avoiding disaster, and growing stronger in an unpredictable World*. London: Profile Books.

⁶ For example, Beck (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

As Amitav Ghosh powerfully notes, expectations of normality, balance and order that defined the modern world view, appear from the vantage point of the Anthropocene to be a terrible error or hubris: as carried to the point of 'great derangement'.⁷ There is a contemporary consensus that: 'There can be no more talk of linear and inexorable progress'.⁸ As Bruno Latour argues:

What makes the Anthropocene a clearly detectable golden spike way beyond the boundary of stratigraphy is that it is the most decisive philosophical, religious, anthropological and ... political concept yet produced as an alternative to the very notions of 'Modern' and 'modernity'.⁹

The Anthropocene, initially a geological concept, claims that human actions have deeply affected and altered geologic processes, destabilising earlier 'Holocene' conditions of stability. Thus, we are threatened with catastrophic climate change not as some sort of 'external' threat to our modernist 'internal' narratives of sustainable development and human progress but precisely because our 'internal' stories of 'progress' and 'development' – the stories of our separation from nature - ignored the fact that we were actually destroying the very foundations of our planetary survival. This is why Anthropocene thinkers argue that the Anthropocene is not just another problem or crisis to be 'solved' or 'bounced-back' from' or 'recouped' but rather a sign that modernity was a false promise of salvation, one that has brought us to the brink of destruction.¹⁰

There is little space here to develop further the claims staked out above. In brief, the dominant critique of resilience-thinking today is that it seeks to 'defer' or evade underlying problems rather than to address them. With the closing off of modernist solutions, resilience appears to be 'coerced' or to be 'artificial', somehow lacking a genuine or real understanding of the limits to maintaining the status quo: this artificiality is sometimes expressed as problems of technical, bureaucratic, depoliticised or 'top-down' approaches which seek to achieve short-term solutions or to paper-over the cracks. Thus, resilience solutions unintentionally cascade problems rather than ameliorating them.¹¹ In response, 'alternative' approaches to resilience have sought to demonstrate the genuine or real capacities of resilience to grasp problems at source.¹² These are framings of 'soft', 'natural', 'critical' or 'community' resilience. However, because the problem is constructed as 'external' to the policy interveners and as 'internal' to the community seen to require resilience, these alternative framings still fail to recuperate critique in the Anthropocene. In fact, the radicalisation of resilience approaches merely highlights the limits of

⁷ Ghosh, A. (2016) *The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 36.

⁸ Bonneuil, C. and Fressoz, J.-B. (2016) *The Shock of the Anthropocene*. London: Verso, 21.

⁹ Latour, B. (2013) *Facing Gaia, Six Lectures on the Political Theology of Nature: Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, Edinburgh, 18th-28th of February 2013* (draft version 1–3-13), 77. Accessed at: https://macaulay.cuny.edu/eportfolios/wa_kefield15/files/2015/01/LATOUR-GIFFORD-SIX-LECTURES_1.pdf.

¹⁰ Latour, *Facing Gaia*; Stengers, I. (2015) *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*. Paris: Open Humanities Press; Tsing, A. L. (2015) *The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹¹ Rist, L., Felton, A., Nystrom, M., Troell, M., Sponseller, R. A., Bengtsson, J., Moen, J. (2014) 'Applying resilience thinking to production ecosystems', *Ecosphere*, 5(6), article 73.

¹² Yarina, L. (2018) 'Your sea wall won't save you', *Places Journal*, March. Accessed at: <https://placesjournal.org/your-sea-wall-wont-save-you/>.

modernist imaginaries that we can still enable ‘them’ to ‘bounce back’ when contemporary sensitivities suggest that it is precisely ‘our’ current modes of being and of perceiving our relationship to the environment which is the problem.

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TRINE FLOCKHART¹ – Understanding the resilience of the liberal order

The liberal international order has for long been assumed to be resilient because it is thought to have global appeal, deeply embedded practices² and no attractive or viable alternatives. The prevailing view was until recently that the liberal international order is resilient because it is ‘easy to join and hard to overturn’.³ However, the optimism has lately given way to apprehension

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² E. Adler, ‘Resilient Liberal International Practices’ in Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart, *Liberal World Orders*, Oxford University Press, 2013

³ G. J. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*, Princeton University Press, 2011

evidenced in the 2015 Munich Security Conference with the telling title, *Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians*.⁴ Even optimists like John Ikenberry now concede that not only is liberal order in crisis, but that ‘something more fundamental is going on’ and that we may be witnessing a ‘crisis of transition’.⁵

However, as suggested by Duncombe and Dunne, ‘claiming that liberal order is in crisis is just the starting point’.⁶ The question I addressed at the COMPASS/IAI/UPTAKE workshop in Rome was therefore how to get a clearer picture of how the liberal order is challenged, and to try to pinpoint how resilience of the liberal order may be in question. The problem is that deciding which parameters to use in assessing liberal order’s resilience is not straightforward and without a framework that is able to differentiate between the different elements making up the liberal international order and without being able to locate and connect the liberal order to other levels of ordering, we cannot fully grasp the extent of the crisis or the precise nature of the challenges to the liberal order’s resilience.

What is needed therefore is a conceptual framework that can ensure coherence in where scholars and practitioners look, and which can differentiate between different policy domains and incorporate different levels of order, whilst at the same time keep track of the different elements that together constitute the liberal international order. I briefly introduce such a framework,⁷ which may be useful for ‘mapping’ how resilience is currently challenged and to provide a starting point for working out what to do about it.

A conceptual framework

There is already a voluminous, and in many ways excellent, literature on the crisis of the liberal international order.⁸ However, mainstream international relations theory has not been able to fully answer important questions about the current changes because of what can be described as adherence by the mainstream of the discipline to the trinity of *stove-piping* into different theoretical camps, *essentialism* through a Western-centric perspective of order and *line-drawing* resulting in a strict differentiation between the domestic and the international in ways that have made the many domestic crises of little interest for liberal order scholars.

To be able to more fully understand the ongoing changes and how they affect the resilience of the liberal international order, a conceptual framework is needed that can overcome these three problems and which thereby is able to more accurately pin point particular challenges to the resilience of the liberal international order.

The framework is located within a growing literature on the importance of culture⁹ and the distribution of identity as well as new English School scholarship on the character and dynamics of the institutional landscape and the role of social practices located in the primary and

⁴ T. Bunde & Oroz, 2015, *Munich Security Report 2015: Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians?*

⁵ G. J. Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, *International Affairs* 94(1): 7 – 23; p. 8

⁶ C. Duncombe & T Dunne, ‘After Liberal Order’ *International Affairs* 94(1)


⁷ A pilot version of the framework is available in T. Flockhart, 2016, ‘The Coming Multi-Order World’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(1): 3-30

⁸ For an overview and categorization of the three dominant strands in the literature see Trine Flockhart, *Ibid*

⁹ *Ibid*, Reus-Smit, 2017, Lebow R, 2008, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press

secondary institutions.¹⁰ The premise is that ordering always takes place within a social domain and always seeks to safeguard its vision of the ‘good life’ and the fundamental conditions for its existence as a social domain, which Bull defined as ‘life, truth and property’.¹¹ From this follows that all ‘ordering domains’ (an ideal-type social domain seeking to establish some sort of order) comprise five **constitutive elements**, conceptualised as the social structures associated with power and identity, which constitute a view of the ‘good life’ within the social domain and which are subsequently practiced through the institutions of the social domain in both primary institutions (embedded practices such as diplomacy, war, great power management, and the rule of law), and secondary institutions (international organisations, regimes and formal and informal relationships).

Figure 1: The ideal-type ordering domain



In addition to the five constitutive elements of the ideal-type ordering domain, the framework identifies four **dimensions** of ordering: *levels; policy; time; and culture*, which together add up to the overall ‘ordering architecture’. The overall global ordering architecture consists of a potentially infinite number of different domains, but some will be more relevant for the liberal order than others. I argue that to fully understand the many challenges to the liberal order, and how the liberal order is affected by changes taking place *inside* the liberal order in its five constitutive *elements* as well as how it is affected by divergence and changes from *outside* originating in other social domains existing within the overall ordering architecture.

The importance of the ‘good life’

The conceptualisation of social domains always striving towards the maintenance of their vision of the ‘good life’ and the understanding that all ordering domains are located within an overall ‘ordering architecture’ is important for understanding how resilience is affected. Moreover, with the introduction of the ‘good life’, resilience can be understood as the ability to continue the main functions of the social domain in such a way that the norms, values and practices

¹⁰ Friedner Parat C, 2017 ‘On the Evolution of the Primary Institutions of International Society’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(3): 623–630; Spandler K, 2015, ‘The political international society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions’, *Review of International Studies*, 41(3): 601-622

¹¹ Bull

associated with the conception of the 'good life' are not severely or permanently compromised. Resilience will naturally primarily be challenged in times of crisis or following major disruptions and is therefore closely associated with the capacity to mitigate or prevent potentially negative impacts once disruptive events have occurred.¹² Seeking to be resilient is therefore a basic function of all social domains, because without resilience, they will not last for long. The liberal international order is no different in this regard, but its complex inter-linkages with other social domains at different levels and different policy domains makes the relevant overall ordering architecture exceedingly complex, without traditional International Relations' theories having been in a position to take account of this complexity. Nevertheless, with a conceptual approach based on ideal-type social domains, we may better be able to identify the nature of the challenges to the liberal international order from outside the liberal order and to be able to assess how the resilience of the liberal international order is affected in each of its constitutive elements.

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¹² Chandler D, 2014, *The Governance of Complexity*, Routledge

TATIANA ROMANOVA¹ – Resilience in EU-Russian relations through the prism of postcolonial theory

With contribution from Elena Pavlova

Introduction

The term ‘resilience’ entered the EU’s external relations vocabulary in the 1990s. In 2012 the European Commission further clarified the notion of resilience.² Resilience became central for the EU’s external relations in 2016 when it was incorporated in the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS). This document provided a new definition of resilience: ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’.³ Finally, in 2017 the EU published a communication, which further clarified the notion of resilience, defining it as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from stresses and shocks”, seeing resilience as “a broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society”.⁴

The concept of resilience entered EU-Russian relations three months before the publication of the EUGS when Federica Mogherini (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission) formulated five principles of the relations with Moscow, of which one was ‘strengthening EU resilience against Russian threats’.⁵ The EUGS did not provide an immediate link between the concept of resilience and Russia but the concept was used when the EU discussed threats that are frequently associated in the EU and its Eastern European neighbours with Russia (for example: energy supply; fake news and strategic communication; and cybersecurity). The 2017 Communication confirmed this link between these threats and Russia for the EU and its eastern neighbours and the resilience necessary to deal with them.⁶

Resilience and the postcolonial approach

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² European Commission (2012). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises*. Brussels, 3 October, COM(2012) 586 final. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf [accessed 12 August 2018].

³ European Union (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy*, Brussels, June. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [accessed 12 August 2018].

⁴ European Commission and High Representative (2017). *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action*. Brussels, 7 June, JOIN(2017) 21 final. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint_communication_-_a_strategic_approach_to_resilience_in_the_eus_external_action-2017.pdf [accessed 12 August 2018].

⁵ Mogherini, F. (2016). *Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council*. Bruxelles, 14 March. ID: 160314_02. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5490/remarks-by-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-at-the-press-conference-following-the-foreign-affairs-council_en [accessed 12 August 2018].

⁶ European Commission and High Representative (2017).

Given the centrality of the concept of resilience in EU's external relations of today and its prolific use in EU-Russian relations, the goal here is to investigate what quality of the relations emerges between the EU and Russia as a result of this concept. The EU's current understanding of the concept of resilience draws on the legacy of its relations with third countries and its foreign policy thinking. For this reason, the postcolonial approach nicely captures the logic behind the strategy, and its results.

Firstly, it illustrates how the EU creatively colonised the "resilience" category. The initial plan of the EUGS' authors was to strike a balance between the promotion of liberal values and realist assumptions about the world through the notion of principled pragmatism and resilience. In the course of its actions the EU transformed resilience from an analytical category (a characteristic of a system) into a normative one. This category allowed the EU to change the way it promotes values from the '*normative power Europe*' way, promoting European norms by 'being' rather than through action, which presupposed inclusion of partners into a normative core (as a result of their evolution); to a defensive normative power, which emphasises the position of the EU as an unquestionable agent of these norms. For this very reason resilience is only promoted unilaterally and, despite the rhetoric about different ways of resilience, only the EU's vision of resilience is taken as the correct one. The postcolonial approach, therefore, illuminates how the concept of resilience allows the EU to preserve its hegemonic position vis-à-vis the subaltern.

Secondly, the postcolonial approach demonstrates how the EU as a hegemon defines the system (the core, the semi-periphery and periphery) by identifying where the vision of resilience will be exported and who generates threats to the system. As a result, the EU is the core; Eastern European neighbours emerge as the semi-periphery, which faces the same threats but also has to be supported through the export of the EU's vision of resilience; while Russia is but a source of these threats. The EU also hierarchically includes eastern neighbours and Russia in its system. Russia's hierarchical inclusion is reinforced by the fact that Russia is not granted a place in the governance of the system and by the fact that the EU gives preference to cooperation with civil society rather than the state of Russia. This hierarchical inclusion directly contradicts the most fundamental principle of Russian foreign policy, its demand for equality with major powers in the world and reinforces its non-constructive behaviour in the international arena.

Conclusion

Resilience in its original meaning, however, is an attractive concept for EU-Russia relations. First, it emphasises that Russia and the EU are parts of the same system given their geographical proximity, connectivity and cultural similarities. Secondly, resilience is probably the only way to deal with the security threats of today because these threats cannot be eliminated. Yet for the concept to fulfil its potential, the EU's understanding of resilience has to be decolonised, it has to go through a process of provincialisation and engagement. More specifically, the EU has to accept in reality (and not only on paper) that there are varying approaches of resilience and to engage with relevant visions. In the case of EU-Russia relations it will mean returning the subjectivity to Russia and dealing with the state of Russia. Decolonisation also means admitting that security threats do not come solely from Russia.

Specific ways of provincialisation and engagement deserve further exploration and present promising avenues for future research.

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SIDDHARTH SAXENA¹ – Silk Road and resilience

The Silk Road which historically signifies this region in particular has lent itself to defining and placing Eurasia and Central Asia as a place for mobility where goods passed through from the East to the West and vice-versa. However, Eurasia as a producer of ideas, peoples and goods often gets left out especially in the global, and particularly Western, imagination, propagating the idea of Eurasia as a thoroughfare. Silk Road has been a place for manufacturing and historically has contributed to scientific, artistic and cultural breakthroughs of global significance but has been left out of current discussion as a producer.

This representation of being a passage (road) and leaving out the significance of being a producer has reinforced the (mis)understanding about Silk Road and led for it to be demarcated as a periphery. Particularly since the fracture of the Soviet Union into the 1 republics, the Eurasia region is increasingly portrayed as a disparate and remote region, and a region which needs to be reconstructed using new and 'modern' framework and principles arising from notions, for example, of Westphalian states. Constituents of Eurasia, be it Central Asia, China or Russia, or south stream regions of the Middle East, South and South East Asia are relegated as incapable players or threats in making. However, this Silk-Road region and its millennia old interconnectedness is where the future of this region lies as is finally being recognised by OBOR (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union projects. It is important to remember that, Eurasia as a coherent geographical construct has existed since at least as early as the Mongol Empire in the 13th century and subsequently in the Timurid Empire which brought large swathes of Eurasia under control.

Such a flawed understanding is a product of decontextualised economic analysis and subsequent mis-matched political and security studies narratives. An economic understanding of production is limited, and limited largely to post-facto analysis of the production phenomenon and process. Economics alone does not have tools either to understand how production originates and how it is sustained. Production is more often rooted in need, not in demand! while the need is correlated to how the society is organised. This societal organisation generates value systems which in turn govern the need itself. If one only uses the prevalent neo-liberal economic frameworks, very construed understandings can emerge. If one turns the analysis around, some key questions can arise from this discourse and help clarify things, for example, let us consider the cure for cancer, for which it is easy estimate the level of demand; and despite this extensive demand and money thrown at it, the market driven systems have not been able provide even a basic cure and resilience against cancer. And similarly how come we are so far behind in alternative energy solutions despite the demand?

So how is this relevant to the case of Eurasia? Historically, Eurasia was the dynamo of curiosity led intellectual development, for e.g. Al-Khwarizmi's discovery of Algorithm, and a wide array of physical and chemical principles, translated mineral wealth into global supply chains of then and now. It was the nurturing of science and 'investment' in human capital that

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has played the key role in creating resilience in Eurasia. This pattern has been repeated through myriad political orders of Khanates, Empires and even in the modern Soviet state periods.

A diagrammatic understanding of Science to Innovation process perhaps can help understand and explain the fabric of the resilience process in Eurasia; the basic principle is as follows:

- *Science (similar to Culture and Music) (grasping principles of nature) →*
 - *Engineering (systemising and controlling process, leading to application of science) →*
 - *Technology and Innovation (making engineering useful for public good and/or commercial gain)*

Thus the premise here is that those policy makers who achieved an understanding of investing in science and human capital as the key to sustainable economic growth were able to create progress at a global scale, despite the challenges of land-locked geographies, harsh climates, political upheaval and unstable globally linked finance, and indeed, low population densities.

So as stated earlier, in the past we have Eurasia at the centre of processes of development, integration and growth, so what does it have to offer now? For one, their natural wealth of vast materials and metals, needed to drive a new era of electronics, refrigeration and energy-storage underpin all other areas of technology and thus global sustainable development, can aid in global development. This is particularly important when going beyond hydrocarbons and Silicon-based technologies which are prevalent today.

For Eurasia specifically, the following concerns are important to keep in mind in order to not compromise its millennia old intrinsic resilience capacity. In a post-Soviet, new liberal world order in which Eurasia re-industrialises, it should not fall for 'easy-options' often discussed by many developing countries which are industrialising now, rather Eurasia is re-industrialising - their starting point in terms of human capital and institutional capacity was/is very different. The countries of Central Asia, for example, need to pay close attention to not getting caught up in thinking that technology transfer is the final goal. On the contrary, it is the starting point for developing further technologies. Access to vast materials and metals base, which are needed to drive the new era of electronics, refrigeration and energy-storage which underpin all other areas of technology do *not* rest with IT, 3-D printing and consumer goods. Countries in Central Asia, especially, are home to natural resources of the kind that are essential in future technologies, from metals to hydrocarbons. New industrial and sub sectors of global relevance have potential to be induced in/from Eurasia through deployment of new scientific ideas. For example, the down-stream potential of the oil and gas industry, mining and agro resources are necessary for producing clean-tech and green technologies as well. Polymers and oxide semi-conductor devices like light emitting diodes, solar cells and transistors; cheap deposition of polymers by printing; improve devices by understanding fundamental laws of physics can all lead to spin-off technologies which can put Eurasia at the forefront of production and high-technology rather than compete with established players in developed fields. So resilience is not the endgame, it is a kind of insurance policy.

Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan have oil and gas and as a result polymers and plastics on the one hand, while together with the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, they have vast reserves of Rare-Earth minerals. This can help them diversify their economies and lead the change rather than play catch up to developed countries. Some examples of these kinds of technologies are Spin Nematics (for the next generation of environmental, medical and industrial sensors for applications ranging from satellite communication to chemical industry heat process management and mining exploration); Computer Memories and Information Transport (e.g. components and fully integrated chips for quantum computation and memory storage); Multifunctional Composites (these can act as both batteries for energy storage and process sunlight for energy production), Magnetic Refrigeration (for example, manipulation of quantum spins can produce refrigeration that no longer requires cumbersome compressors or use of environmentally damaging gases such as CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) and HCFCs (hydro-chlorofluorocarbons) like R-12 or R-22. Such technologies have the potential to power our computers, keep our food fresh); and High-Temperature Superconductivity (for dissipation-less transmission of electricity and production of magnets for Maglev High Speed trains as well as plasma confinement reactors for energy production).

Conclusion

Oxford dictionary defines Resilience as ‘the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties and with toughness’. Historically, Eurasia has not only been resilient but rather been the epicentre of change, transformation and production. Whether it was the Silk Road, or home to the most ancient and great civilisations in the world, Eurasia has been at the centre of all things new. The natural connectedness of the Eurasian region allowed for a sharing of resources and led to some of the world’s best science. Home to a plethora of materials and metals, renewable and non-renewable sources of energy, the countries of Eurasia have benefitted from each other through interactions in knowledge production along with exchanges of goods and peoples which has been at the heart of progress through time and space.

Even in Soviet times Central Asian countries remained connected with flexible borders, if any, and shared infrastructure which favoured interaction. It is only since the end of the Cold War that we have seen Eurasia, especially countries in Central Asia, question and struggle with their place in the world. Rather than play catch-up to the world’s leading economies, countries in the region should look to development paradigms which are Eurasian in character and are generated from within. International organisations and think tanks bring with them Euro-centric concepts of development, economic and otherwise, and fail to take into account the knowledge and technologies that exist within Eurasia.

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AKRAM UMAROV¹ - Foreign policy of Uzbekistan in supporting to build state resilience in Afghanistan

Introduction

Uzbekistan in its foreign policy has traditionally adhered to the fundamental principle of establishing peace and stability in the immediate neighborhood, developing mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation with all neighboring states. Uzbekistan has faced and continues to face serious threats and challenges to national and regional security stemming from the internal conflict in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Tashkent has consistently involved itself in the process of reaching reconciliation between the main opposing sides in Afghanistan to stabilize the Afghan conflict through promotion of the bilateral and regional relations with Kabul. In 2008, the First President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, put forward an initiative to restore the contact group "6+2" successfully operating in the second half of the 1990s² under the auspices of the United Nations, transforming it into a "6+3" group, including in its composition along with the neighboring states, Russia and the United States, as well as NATO. This group planned to become a consultative body of the international community operating under the auspices of the United Nations and an important tool for achieving the goals of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.³ Undoubtedly, there is a complex situation, requiring time, patience, political will and mutual compromises between the opposing sides on key issues that separate the country. But at the same time the alternatives for establishing peace and stability are few.

In addition, it is extremely important to ensure the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan, respect for its ethno-demographic characteristics and the religious foundations of the Afghan people, for this, the unconditional fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by the international community to assist in the socio-economic revival of the country are needed. The importance of the active participation of neighbouring countries in Afghanistan in the settlement of the situation has been stressed by US President Barack Obama in his strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009.⁴

The countries in the region have argued that the conflict in Afghanistan has a negative impact on virtually all political and economic processes in Central Asia and is potentially one of the main destabilizing factors in the region.

The election of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has given new impetus to the policy of increasing cooperation and settling certain issues in relations with neighbouring states. Undoubtedly, a

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² A political group of the six nations bordering with Afghanistan – China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus the United States and Russia, which functioned from 1997 to 2001 under the aegis of the United Nations. The coalition worked to find a peaceful solution of the Afghan conflict. On 19 July 1999, the Group adopted the Tashkent Declaration "On Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan". In the declaration, the parties agreed not to provide military support to any Afghan party and to prevent the use of their territories for such purposes.

³ Karimov, I. A. (2008). 'Po puti modernizatsii strani i ustoychivogo pazvitiya ekonomiki'. Speech at the NATO summit, 3 April 2009. [По пути модернизации страны и устойчивого развития экономики]. Taskent: T16, pp 241-242

⁴ Obama's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18952/>

special place in this context is occupied by Afghanistan, with which the country is bound by close ties of friendship and good-neighbourliness, based on a common history, culture, traditions and values. There have been meetings between the highest offices in both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan since September 2016 where they agreed to on further cooperation between the countries. During a speech at a joint meeting of the Legislative Chamber and Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan on September 9, 2017. President Mirziyoyev pointed out: "Uzbekistan will traditionally pursue good-neighbourly and friendly policy towards Afghanistan".⁵ This has been followed by monthly contacts between official representatives of the two states. The Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov visited Afghanistan on January 23-24, 2017 which led to fruitful meetings with President Ghani, Minister of Foreign Affairs Rabbani and other leaders of this country.

As a result of the visit, a number of bilateral documents were signed. Among them is the Action Plan ("Roadmap") for the further development of full-scale cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan for 2017. The document regulates bilateral activities in the political, trade-economic and transport-transit areas, as well as intensification of cooperation in the energy, mining, oil and gas industry, agriculture, health and pharmaceuticals. The opening of the Trade House of Uzbekistan in Kabul was a confirmation of the parties' commitment to intensify trade and economic relations.

A separate Protocol of intentions on further development of cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure was also confirmed. Bilateral negotiations have led to plans to build large infrastructure projects - the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway (730 km, cost about \$ 3 billion)⁶ and the Surkhan-Puli-Khumri transmission line (260 km, 150 million USD)⁷, which would contribute to the further expansion of trade and economic cooperation between our countries and to the creation of new jobs, the growth of the economy of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan also plans to join the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project.⁸

The importance of the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan "Peace process, security cooperation and regional connectivity", held in March 2018, to achieve peace and reconciliation in this country has been emphasized. As a result, active economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, bilateral trade turnover has been increasing considerably for the last three years. In 2015, the volume of mutual trade between the two countries amounted to

⁵ Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2016). 'Vystuplenie prem'er-ministra Respubliki Uzbekistan Sh. M. Mirziyoyeva na sovmestnom zasedanii Zakonodal'noi Palaty i Senata Oliy Mazhlisa [Выступление премьер-министра Республики Узбекистан Ш.М.Мирзиёева на совместном заседании Законодательной Палаты и Сената Олий Мажлиса]. Published on 9 september 2016 <http://press-service.uz/ru/news/5325/>

⁶ News agency Podrobno.uz (2018a). 'Afghanistan smozhet uvelichit' tovarooborot na 50% blagodarya zh/d Mazari-Sharif-Great'[Афганистан сможет увеличить товарооборот на 50% благодаря ж/д Мазари-Шариф–Герат.] Published on 23 March 2018 at <http://podrobno.uz/cat/economic/afganistan-smozhet-uvelichit-tovarooborot-na-50-blagodarya-zh-d-mazari-sharif-gerat/>

⁷ News agency Spot.uz (2018). "'Uzbeknegro" pristuplo k stroitel'stvu novoi LEP v Afghanistan za \$150 mln. [«Узбекэнерго» приступило к строительству новой ЛЭП в Афганистан за \$150 млн.. Published on 23 April 2018 at <https://www.spot.uz/ru/2018/03/24/afgan/>

⁸ News agency Gazeta.uz (2018). 'Uzbekistan budet uchastvovat' v proekte TAPI' [Узбекистан будет участвовать в проекте ТАПИ.]. Published on 23 April 2018 at <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/04/23/tapi/>

\$444.5 million,⁹ in 2016 - \$ 519.7 million.¹⁰ In 2017, bilateral trade increased by 19% to \$ 617.1 million.¹¹

The appointment of the Special Representative of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Afghanistan Ismatulla Irgashev in May 2017,¹² further indicates the rapprochement and growth of cooperation between the countries. The Afghan conflict affects the interests of many regional and global powers, and the solution which suits some of them may be contrary to the thoughts and aspirations of others.

On June 22, 2018, the UN General Assembly at the plenary session adopted the resolution, "Strengthening regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Central Asian Region".¹³ The document, the draft of which was developed by Uzbekistan jointly with the neighbouring states of Central Asia, was unanimously supported by all the UN member states. The adoption of the resolution at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2017, in New York is further proof of Uzbekistan's efforts in solving problems in Afghanistan.

This rapprochement between Uzbekistan (and Central Asia) and Afghanistan has a great historic foundation. Afghanistan has always been an integral part of Central Asia. The states of Central Asia and Afghanistan have a common history, religion, culture and traditions, as well as common interests in the field of security and trade development. For example, from the Greco-Bactrian and Kushan kingdoms, to the Timurids and the Mughals, Afghanistan has remained part of the regional complex which stretches from the northern regions of modern Kazakhstan (the Golden Horde) to the coastal regions of modern India.

Conclusion

Uzbekistan is aware that the achievement of peace and stability in Afghanistan is a decisive factor not only for regional but also for global security. Afghan stabilization could open up opportunities for resolving vital problems of sustainable socio-economic development for all states and peoples living in this vast region of Central Asia. Joint and coordinated actions are required in addressing the problems of strengthening the fight against terrorism and drug

⁹ News agency Kommersant.uz (2016). 'V 2016 godu tovarooborot mezhdu Uzbekistanom i Afghanistanom uzhe prevysli \$429 mln' [В 2016 году товарооборот между Узбекистаном и Афганистаном уже превысил \$429 млн]. Published on 26 December 2016 at <http://kommersant.uz/news/tovarooborot-uz-afg>

¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Trade of Uzbekistan (S.D.). 'Informatsiya o' torgovo-ekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve mezhdu Respublikoi Uzbekistan i Islamskoi Respublikoi Afghanistan' [Информация о торгово-экономическом сотрудничестве между Республикой Узбекистан и Исламской Республикой Афганистан]. Available at: <https://mft.uz/ru/country/AFG>

¹¹ News agency Podrobno.uz (2018b). 'Uzbekistan predlozhit Afghanistanu razvivat' prigranichnyuyu torgovlyu, a takzhe snizit' poshliny i tarif'y' [Узбекистан предложил Афганистану развивать приграничную торговлю, а также снизить пошлины и тарифы]. Published on 9 July 2018 at <https://www.podrobno.uz/cat/economic/uzbekistan-predlozhit-afg/>

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2017). 'Naznachen Spetspredstavitel' Prezidenta Uzbekistana po Afghanistanu' [Назначен Спецпредставитель Президента Узбекистана по Афганистану]. Published on 25 May 2017 at <http://mfa.uz/ru/press/news/2017/05/11113/>

¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2018). Statement of MFA of The Republic of Uzbekistan in connection with the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution «Strengthening regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Central Asian Region». Published on 23 June 2018 at <https://mfa.uz/en/press/statements/2018/06/15222/>

production in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has demonstrated its determination in helping to stabilize Afghanistan in the implementation of specific projects for peaceful construction, the restoration of the economy of the neighbouring state destroyed by the long-term war. Tashkent intends to continue its practical assistance in creating the infrastructure of Afghanistan, to increase trade and cultural-humanitarian relations, considering this as an indispensable condition for ensuring peace and prosperity in this country.

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